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Abstract We examine the effect of energy efficiency
incentives on household energy efficiency home im-
provements. Starting in February 2007, Italian
homeowners have been able to avail themselves of tax
credits on the purchase and installation costs of certain
types of energy efficiency renovations.We examine two
such renovations—door/window replacements and
heating system replacements—using multi-year cross-
section data from the Italian Consumer Expenditure
Survey and focusing on a narrow period around the
introduction of the tax credits. Our regressions control
for dwelling and household characteristics and
economy-wide factors likely to influence the replace-
ment rates. The effects of the policy are different for the
two types of renovations. With window replacements,
the policy is generally associated with a 30 % or stron-
ger increase in the renovation rates and number of
renovations. In the simplest econometric models, the
effect is not statistically significant, but the results get
stronger whenwe allow for heterogeneous effects across
the country. With heating system replacements, simpler
models suggest that the tax credits policy had no effect
whatsoever or that free riding was rampant, i.e., people
are now accepting subsidies for replacements that they
would have done anyway. Further examination suggests
a strong degree of heterogeneity in the effects across
warmer and colder parts of the country, and effects in the
colder areas that are even more pronounced than those
for window replacements. These results should, howev-
er, be interpreted with caution due to the low rates of
renovations, which imply that the effects are estimated
relatively imprecisely.
Keywords Energy efficiency policy . Household
behavior . Italy . Energy consumption survey
JEL Classification Q41 . D12 . H3
Introduction and motivation
Incentives such as rebates and tax credits are currently
offered to homeowners in the US and many other coun-
tries to encourage energy efficiency home renovations
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and appliance replacement. Insulation, heating and
cooling systems, water heaters, and high-efficiency ap-
pliances (such as refrigerators, freezers, clothes washers
and dryers, and dishwashers) are typically covered by
these programs. A major goal of these policies is to
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases associated
with electricity generation and energy use in the home.
A possible additional benefit of reducing energy use is
that doing so will diminish reliance on fuel imports.
Support for these policies is motivated by their large
potential, as buildings account for some 30–40 % of all
energy use, and alleged low or even negative cost
(Levine et al. 2007; Choi Granade et al. 2009).
At least in the US, however, residential energy
efficiency incentives have been present since the
1970s (Hassett and Metcalf 1995), usually in the
form of income tax credits and other government
subsidies, or as Demand Side Management (DSM)
programs established and run by the electricity and
gas utilities. The latter were usually conducted to
aid peak load management and reduce demand so
as to avoid investment in infrastructure and the
construction of new generation facilities.1
Evaluating incentive programs requires answering
three key, and related, questions. The first is how re-
sponsive households are to the incentive amount: In
other words, by how much must the incentive be raised
to result in the desired number of energy efficiency
adoptions? Second, what is the reduction in energy use
(and associated carbon emissions) that can be correctly
ascribed to the program? Third, what is the cost (to
households, taxpayers, and other parties) per unit of
energy or carbon emissions avoided, and how does that
compare with that of alternate policies?
Despite the extensive reliance on residential energy
efficiency incentives, the evidence about the first ques-
tion is mixed and inconclusive. Walsh (1989) finds that
federal incentives have no effect on energy efficiency
renovations (or expenditures). Hassett and Metcalf
(1995) use panel data and account for unobserved
household heterogeneity using fixed effects, finding that
a 10 % increase in the US federal tax credit leads to a
24 % increase in the likelihood of performing energy
efficiency home improvements. Boomhower and Davis
(2013) deploy a regression discontinuity design to study
a large-scale appliance replacement program in Mexico
and conclude that the rebate does increase program
participation, but not by much: An increase in the rebate
offered to consumers from $110 to $170 (a 54 % in-
crease) raises participation by 21 %.
Identifying the energy use reductions that can cor-
rectly be attributed to incentive programs—the second
key question above—is even more challenging due to
the heterogeneity of consumer behaviors and the likeli-
hood that some of them will be counterproductive.
Incentive programs are voluntary and as such they
may attract persons who are more proficient at reducing
energy use or implementing energy efficiency upgrades.
The presence of these persons will overstate the cost-
effectiveness of the program (Joskow and Marron
1992).
An important concern is free riding, which occurs
when the economic agents targeted by the policy take
the incentives, but would have done the home renova-
tions or appliance replacements anyway. This may hap-
pen because (1) the energy efficiency characteristics of
the renovation are not separable from other technical or
aesthetic features that would have motivated the reno-
vation anyway (new windows that are both pleasant to
look at and more heat efficient), (2) the agents were
already convinced that the resulting efficiency improve-
ment was worth its cost, or (3) the agents replace
existing equipment only when it breaks beyond repair.
An earlier meta-analysis of demand-side manage-
ment programs conducted by the utilities suggests that
the share of free riders ranges between 0 % and 50 %
(Joskow and Marron 1992), whereas Malm (1996) esti-
mates that 89 % of the households he examined would
have purchased a high-efficiency heating system even in
the absence of subsidies. Blumstein (2010) and Vine
et al. (2001) discuss the difficulty of recognizing free
riders and the use of survey evidence to establish if
someone is a free rider. Shorrock (1999) studies the
uptake of UK government grants for home insulation
and estimates the “natural” rate at which insulation is
installed as the intercept in a regression of insulation
acquisitions on grant expenditure.
Grösche and Vance (2009) examine renovations
using cross-section data from the 2005 German Resi-
dential Energy Consumption Survey, and conclude that
free riding, which they define as the situation in which a
household’s willingness to pay for renovations exceeds
their cost, occurs in 50 % of the cases. Boomhower and
1 Earlier assessments of these programs have therefore focused on
their effect on the reliability of the electricity supply system (see,
for example, Kushler et al. 2003) or in reducing conventional air
pollution emissions associated with power generation (e.g., Vine
2003).
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Davis (2013) estimate a price elasticity of the demand
for appliance replacement, and use it to predict that
about three-quarters of the rebate recipients in Mexico
are free riders.
In practice, some studies simply assume free rider-
ship away, others assume that the impact of free riders
cancels out with other behavioral responses (Haberl
et al. 1998), and others yet assume that a specific per-
centage of the program participants are free riders (e.g.,
Allaire and Brown 2012). Ignoring free riders overstates
the cost-effectiveness of an incentive program—the
third key question above—sometimes to a staggering
extent (Joskow and Marron 1992). Hartman (1988)
establishes that the average conservation truly attribut-
able to an audit program—a popular DSM initiative—is
only 39 % of the savings calculated based on a naïve
comparison between participants and non-participants.
Waldman and Ozog (1996) estimate that the DSM pro-
gram they analyze accounts for only 71 % of the total
conservation, the remaining 29 % being “natural” con-
servation (i.e., that would have happened regardless).
Based on a nationwide sample of utilities and annual
reports on energy sales and DSM expenditures,
Loughran and Kulik (2004) estimate that DSM expen-
ditures reduced electricity usage by 0.3–0.4 % at a cost
of $0.14–0.22/kWh, which exceeds the price charged to
consumers. This estimate is in sharp contrast with the
utilities’ own report of 1.8–2.3 % at a cost of $0.02–
0.03/kWh.2 Loughran and Kulik conclude that the util-
ities fail to recognize participant selection into these
programs—namely that participants would have done
the energy efficiency investment even in the absence of
the DSM incentives.3
Energy efficiency incentive programs may engender
a number of other behavioral effects. Assistance with a
specific type of energy efficiency investment, for exam-
ple, may free up income that can be spent on other,
additional energy efficiency investments. Grösche
et al. (2013) predict that as incentives increase,
households substitute away from simpler, less
expensive energy efficiency renovations (such as adding
insulation or replacing the heating system) to more
complex and expensive ones (e.g., windows, doors, or
other structural changes). The latter are less cost-
effective in terms of energy savings and carbon emis-
sions reductions.
Gillingham and Palmer (2013) and Blumstein (2010)
discuss free drivers, namely persons who do not avail
themselves of the incentives offered by a program, but
choose to make energy efficiency purchases because
their awareness has been raised by the existence of the
program. Young (2008) documents another potential
threat to energy efficiency incentive programs—namely
when individuals accept an incentive and add to the
stock of energy-using capital in their homes, rather than
replacing an existing, inefficient appliance. She un-
covers that a non-negligible share of Canadian house-
holds do not dispose of old and inefficient refrigerators
once they replace them with new ones. Instead, they
keep using them as “beer fridges” (to store cold bever-
ages), for a net increase in electricity consumption. This
can be avoided with careful incentive program design,
which in turn will increase program complexity and the
associated administrative and enforcement costs.
Is free riding widespread in the presence of incen-
tives, and is always as severe as earlier studies have
found? If other behavioral responses are present, what is
the net effect of an incentive program? In this paper,
attention is focused on a tax credit policy for
homeowners that has been in place in Italy since Febru-
ary 2007.4 Effective from February 19, 2007, a national
law allowed homeowners (as well as owners of build-
ings used for commercial and industrial purposes) to
deduct from their income taxes up to 55 % of the
expenses sustained to implement certain types of energy
efficiency renovations or source of renewable energy in
existing homes (commercial buildings).5 (Earlier legis-
lation in place since 1998 allowed deductions for reno-
vations—36 % of expenses—but did not target energy
efficiency renovations.)
These include the replacement of the heating system,
attic and wall insulation, window and door replacement,
the entire building envelope, and solar panels to be used
for heating water (photovoltaics are specifically exclud-
ed because they are addressed by other laws and
2 The cost-effectiveness figures are somewhat more favorable
when attention is restricted to the subset of utilities that report
positive DSM expenditures in every year of the study.
3 Auffhammer et al. (2008) dispute these findings on definitions,
metrics, and econometrics grounds.
4 DM 19/02/07 and subsequent laws. Currently ruled by DL 6/12/
2011.
5 Caps of €30,000, €60,000, and €100,000 per residential unit
apply, depending on the type of renovations.
Energy Efficiency (2014) 7:571–590 573
programs). Applications for the tax credits must be
accompanied by a professional engineer’s certification
of the renovations and estimated energy savings. After
2007, the law was amended, in that changes were made
to the number of years over which the tax deduc-
tions can be spread. The Italian Renewable Energy
Agency (ENEA 2008, 2009, 2010) reports that
there were 106,000 filings for the tax deduction
for tax year 2007, 248,000 for tax year 2008, and
237,000 for tax year 2009. These documents also
calculate the cost-effectiveness of the emissions
reductions made possible by the energy savings
attributed to these renovations (assuming no free
riding). ENEA (2010) reports that in 2009, 49 %
of the filings were for window and door replace-
ment, 30 % for heating system replacement, 15 %
for thermal solar panels, 4 % for attic or floor
insulation (“horizontal” in the language of the
law), and 2 % for “vertical” wall insulation.
In this paper, we use household-level data from the
Italian Consumer Expenditure Survey to examine the
rate at which (potential) energy efficiency home im-
provements are done and to see whether this rate was
affected by the tax credit policy. We take care to avoid
attributing to the policy effects that are due to long-term
trends or macroeconomic shocks. Specifically, we limit
the sample to a narrow “window” (2004–2009) around
the introduction of the tax credits policy, test for pre-
trends, and control for factors likely to affect energy
efficiency renovations.
Attention is focused on window/door replace-
ments and heating system replacements. We find
that door and window replacements increase when
the policy is introduced, especially at locations
with harsher climates. The findings are less clear
for heating system replacements. The simplest
models find that the policy has had no effect
whatsoever on heating system replacements, or
that free riding must have been pervasive. Further
analyses, however, suggest that there is a consid-
erable degree of heterogeneity of the effects across
the territory, and that the policy raises the replace-
ment rates and numbers considerably in the colder
parts of the country (Northern Italy).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
We present data and models in the “Methods” section.
“The data” section describes the data. The “Results”
section presents the results. “Conclusions” section pro-
vides concluding remarks.
Methods
Data sources
At the time of this writing, no official government-
conducted surveys exist in Italy that are dedicated to
residential energy consumption.6 Moreover, the individ-
ual taxpayer filings authorized by the 2007 tax credit
law and described in the ENEA reports are not publicly
available. For these reasons, we use information about
energy efficiency upgrades in the home using the Italian
Consumer Expenditure Survey (Indagine sui Consumi
delle Famiglie), which is conducted annually by the
Italian Statistics Institute (ISTAT).
We have 13 waves of the Italian Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey. Our dataset is multi-year cross-sections,
covers a total of 13 years from 1997 to 2009, before
and when the policy was in place, and contains about
23,000 households each year, for a total of 311,456
observations.
The Italian Consumer Expenditure Survey (hence-
forth abbreviated as I-CEX) gathers information about
food and household expenditures incurred in the week
prior to the survey, the most recent energy bills, home
maintenance expenditures (“manutenzione ordinaria”),
and home renovation expenditures (“manutenzione
straordinaria”) incurred in the last 3 months prior to
the interview. Within the latter category, the respondent
is specifically asked whether he (1) replaced windows
and doors, (2) replaced the heating system, and (3) did
other exterior and interior renovations. Clearly, items (1)
and (2) are two renovations targeted by the tax-
deduction incentive policy, and so we can examine
whether they have become more frequent when the
incentive is present. The I-CEX questionnaire does not
inquire about tax credits for specific energy efficiency
upgrades, and so what we do observe is simply whether
or not the household did certain types of energy
6 Such surveys are available in other countries. For example, the
Energy Information Agency within the US Department of Energy
administers the Residential Energy Consumption Survey (see
http://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/). A similar study
was conducted in Germany in 2005 (Grösche and Vance 2009)
and information about dwellings, renovations, and energy use in
the UK is gathered through the English Housing Survey (see
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/88370/EHS_Headline_Report_2011-2012.
pdf) and a variety of household surveys, including the British
Household Panel Survey (see Meier and Rehdanz 2010) and the
Continuous Household Survey (see Gans et al. 2013).
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efficiency renovations, regardless of any tax credits
received.
In our regressions (described below), we must con-
trol for other factors that influence the propensity to
undertake energy efficiency renovations. These include,
among others, structural characteristics of the home
(e.g., size and vintage of the home) and characteristics
of the household, such as income, and the number and
ages of the household members (documented in the I-
CEX). They also include energy prices, climate, and the
state of the economy and of the housing market.
Energy prices were gathered from assorted sources,
including ISTAT, the Italian Energy Authority, and
Eurostat. Weather information comes from the T3 Glob-
al Surface Summary of the Day records from the US
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency. We
obtained daily temperatures from the weather stations in
each Region,7 and used them to create daily and month-
ly heating degree days (HDDs) and cooling degree days
(CDDs) at the Region level. We further aggregated
HDDs and CDDs to annual totals in the 12 months prior
to the time of the survey. Although we have weather
data at a fine geographical resolution (the monitoring
station level), we use regional aggregates because the I-
CEX dataset only identifies the Region where the house-
hold lives.
We use unemployment rates by Region and year
dummies to control for the state of the economy, and
the sales of homes in the Region, normalized by the
population of that Region, to control for the conditions
of the housingmarket. The number of home sales comes
from the Agenzia per Il Territorio (the Italian Land
Agency), whereas unemployment and population fig-
ures are provided by ISTAT.
Theoretical considerations
Decisions about energy-using capital (or home renova-
tions that improve the thermal integrity of the dwelling)
and energy usage are usually represented assuming a
two-stage utility maximization process. In the first stage,
the household chooses the level of consumption of other
goods and the desired level of “energy services” (e.g.,
thermal comfort). In the second stage, the household
chooses the combination of capital stock K and energy
use E that minimizes expenditure for any given level of
energy services. At the optimum, the slope of the
isoquant representing the possible combinations of cap-
ital and energy for any given technology is equal to the
ratio of capital and energy prices.
Figure 1 depicts a possible set of isoquants and
isocost lines. The technology represented in isoquant
S2 is more efficient than that in isoquant S1 since the
former uses less energy at any given level of capital. At a
given initial level of prices, the hypothetical household
represented in Fig. 1 selects optimal point A. Subsidies
or tax credits expressed as a percentage of the price of
capital change the isocost line, which becomes steeper
and has a higher K-intercept. This results in optimum B,
which uses more capital and less energy than A.
It can be shown that the first-order conditions for the
optimum imply that households energy-saving home
renovations to the point where the marginal benefit from
the investment (the marginal willingness to pay for
thermal comfort) is equal to the private marginal cost
of the investment. On aggregating the individual house-
holds’ demand functions, one obtains the market de-
mand for home renovations, which is the solid down-
ward sloping line in Fig. 2. The private optimum num-
ber of renovations is Q1.
Using energy, however, generates externalities (such
as emissions of conventional pollutants and CO2 asso-
ciated with power generation, excessive load on the
grid, dependence on foreign imports of fuel, etc.), and
so the social marginal benefit is the dashed line in Fig. 2.
The social optimum is Q*, which is clearly greater than
Q1.
Offering a tax credit on the cost of energy efficiency
investments lowers the marginal cost of the investment
(dashed flat line in Fig. 2), but if households cannot be
7 In Italy, a Region is a jurisdiction with authority similar to that of
a US State, a Canadian Province, or a German Länder. There are a
total of 20 Regions in Italy.
Fig. 1 Optimal choice of capital equipment (or home renovation)
and energy use
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forced to internalize the externalities associated with
energy production and use, the final outcome will be at
point C, and those households that would have done the
renovation at the initial, unsubsidized cost level—the
free riders—will simply pocket the amount of money
corresponding to the area of rectangle DFAE.
In this paper, we use household-level data to examine
specific energy efficiency upgrade decisions. Our
dataset does not document whether a household re-
ceived incentives to do energy efficiency renovations,
and it cannot be used to identify free riders. It does,
however, allow us to capture the heterogeneity of the
individual households’ private benefits.
The theoretical model predicts that a household will
replace the heating system, put in new energy efficient
windows, or do another energy efficiency upgrade in the
home if the net benefits from this renovation (namely,
the value of the heating services or thermal integrity,
plus other benefits, minus the costs) are positive.
In practice, various factors can affect this basic ben-
efit–cost calculus. The benefits of energy efficiency
upgrades should depend on the structural characteristics
of the home and household characteristics (e.g., the
presence of small children or elderly household mem-
bers, income, etc.), and are reasonably expected to be
larger in harsher climates. One would also expect energy
efficiency upgrades to be more attractive than keeping
the existing equipment when energy prices are rising or
at locations where the energy prices are high.
The costs of a renovation are comprised of the initial
outlay to purchase and install the equipment, plus main-
tenance and operating costs. A government incentive
lowers the initial outlay and increases the attractiveness
of a home energy efficiency renovation, but only if the
cost of applying for the incentive is smaller than the
incentive. We would therefore expect incentive-
subsidized renovations to account for fewer than
100 % of the total number of renovations.
Our earlier theoretical exposition presumes that indi-
viduals are perfectly informed about prices, policies,
and equipment technical characteristics, and that they
have access to credit to finance their purchases. How-
ever, there has beenmuch debate in academic and policy
circles about incomplete information, misperceptions,
cognitive limitations, restricted access to credit, transac-
tion costs, and on the role played by these factors in the
so-called energy efficiency gap (Golove and Eto 1996;
Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Allcott and Greenstone 2012).
For these reasons, the household’s education level, in-
come, and assets may influence decisions, and we con-
trol for them in our empirical work.
Econometric approach
Ideally, to assess the effect of a policy, one would like to
have observations before and after the policy from two
groups of economic agents—a group that is subject to
the policy, and one that is unaffected and thus serves as a
control group. Unfortunately, it is not possible for us to
implement such a “difference-in-difference” study de-
sign due to the lack of a control group in our main
source of data.8
Given these data limitations, we simply compare the
behaviors of (different samples of) homeowners before
and after the implementation of the tax credits policy. To
avoid attributing to the policy effects that are truly due to
other factors, we (1) restrict the sample to a relatively
narrow window around the passage of the tax credit law
so as to keep conditions relatively constant and free
from long-term effects, (2) carefully test for pre-trends,
and (3) control for economy-wide shocks and for the
conditions of local housing markets. Once the factors in
(3) are controlled for, it is assumed that any difference in
a household’s propensity to do renovations before and
during the policy year is solely due to the policy.
Fig. 2 Social and private marginal benefits and free riding
8 Renters do not constitute a legitimate control group. Their land-
lords are still entitled to the tax credits, provided that they meet the
other requirements of the law, and at any rate the I-CEX question-
naire does not collect any information on home renovations from
those households who rent their homes. Likewise, households
living in multi-family housing or the homeowners association are
eligible to receive the tax credits. One option might be to select
renovations not covered by the tax credits and regard this type of
renovations as the “control group.” Unfortunately, the Italian
Consumer Expenditure Survey gathers data about home renova-
tions using such broad definitions that it is impossible to identify
an unambiguous “control” type of renovations.
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We check for pre-existing trends by estimating the
linear probability model:
y kð Þit ¼ αþ xitβþ
X
t
γtDt þ εit ð1Þ
where (k) denotes the type of energy efficiency renova-
tion covered by the policy (e.g., heating system, doors
andwindows, etc.), y is a dummy that takes on a value of
one if the renovation was done in the 3 months prior to
the interview, i denotes the household, t the year, and the
sample is limited to pre-policy years. Vector x is com-
prised of house, household, and economy-wide factors
thought to affect the decision to do an energy efficiency
home renovation, and theDs are year dummies.We then
test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the year
dummies are jointly equal to zero.9
After making sure that there are no pre-existing
trends, we estimate two econometric models. The first
is the linear probability model:
y kð Þit ¼ αþ xitβþ δ⋅POLICYt þ εit ð2Þ
where POLICY is a dummy that takes on a value of one
in 2007–2009. We test the null hypothesis that δ=0.
Failure to reject this null hypothesis would imply that
either the policy has no effect (i.e., it has not been
sufficient to stimulate energy efficiency renovations)
or that there is free riding.
The second is
y kð Þit ¼ αþ xitβþ
X
t
γtDt þ δ⋅POLICYþ λ⋅ POLICYt  HDDitð Þ þ εit
ð3Þ
which posits that the attractiveness of the incentives
depend on local climate. In Eq. (2), HDD denotes the
annual degree days.
In this paper, we present regression results for two
alternate dummy dependent variables, namely (1) re-
placing doors and windows and (2) replacing the
heating system. These renovations are covered by the
tax credit policy, as long as the homeowner is willing to
comply with the filing requirements and does file with
the tax authority, and indeed replacing doors and win-
dows alone accounted for 49 % of the filings in 2009,
according to ENEA (2010). Heating system
replacements accounted for 30 % of the filings in 2009
(ENEA 2010).
We estimate Eqs. (1)–(3) by weighted least squares
(using the probability sampling weights provided by the
Italian Statistics Institute), and since many variables are
measured at the Region level, we cluster the standard
errors around the Region (Moulton 1990; Wooldridge
2010, p. 865), which means that our standard errors and
t statistics are both heteroskedasticity-robust and robust
to the presence of correlation between observations
from the same Region. Our sample is restricted to
owners of single-family homes and apartments in
multi-family dwellings with their own heating system,
as long as they live in the homes they own.10 We reason
that this makes them the bearers of the cost and the
beneficiaries of any savings and other consequences of
their renovation decisions.
Vector x includes determinants of energy efficiency
investments, such as energy prices, heating and cooling
degree days in the Region where the household resides,
dwelling characteristics (size, type, and vintage), house-
hold characteristics (size, ages and education of the
household members, income), and month of the survey.
Importantly, x includes controls for the conditions of the
real estate market and for economy-wide factors that
might affect a household’s propensity to invest in its
home.
Additional specifications
For good measure, we also estimate the probit equiva-
lents of (1)–(3). For example, the probit model corre-
sponding to (3) is
E y kð Þit
 
¼ Pr y kð Þit ¼ 1
 
¼ Φ α þ xitβ þ
X
t
γtD

t þ λ⋅ POLICYt  HDDitð Þ
 !
ð4Þ
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cdf. The probit is
estimated by weighted maximum likelihood.
When estimating residential fuel demand, researchers
often regard the choice of heating fuel as simultaneously
determined with the demand for that fuel (e.g., Dubin
and McFadden 1984; Mansur et al. 2008). We likewise
test for whether a household choice of natural gas as the
9 An alternate specification that produces similar results simply
enters a linear time trend in the right-hand side of Eq. (1) in lieu of
the year dummies.
10 Depending on the year, 71–76 % of the households in the I-
CEX own their home, mirroring nationwide homeownership rates.
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primary heating fuel is endogenous with the decision to
replace windows or the heating system itself. This can
be accomplished in a number of ways, all of which are
based on two equations. The first equation explains the
decision to do the renovation conditional on all regres-
sors and on whether piped gas is used as the heating
fuel. The second equation explains whether the house-
hold uses piped natural gas for heating as a function of a
set of instruments. We experiment with (1) a bivariate
probit model as in Evans and Schwab (1995); (2) two
simultaneous linear probability models, which are esti-
mated using two stages least squares (Evans and
Schwab 1995); and (3) a variant on the Heckman two-
step approach.
Formally, approach (1) posits that
y kð Þit ¼ xitβþ GASHEATit⋅βG þ POLICYt⋅δ þ εit ð5Þ
GASHEATit ¼ xitθþ witτþ ηit ð6Þ
where w is a vector of identifying instruments, θ and τ
are vector of coefficients, and ε and η are correlated
zero-mean error terms. Error terms ε and η are assumed
to be jointly normally distributed. By contrast, approach
(2) does not make any assumptions about the joint
distribution of the error terms and models the binary
dependent variables directly (instead of the latent vari-
ables y* and GASHEAT*). Finally, approach (3) fits a
probit of the decision to use natural gas heat, forms an
inverse Mills ratio for it, and enters the latter in the right-
hand side of a linear probability equation for the deci-
sion to do an energy efficient home renovation.
In Eq. (6), our identifying instruments are the length
of the gas network in the Region and a proxy for the
availability of network gas at the home of the respon-
dent, which we construct as the length of the gas pipe-
lines in the Region of residence interacted with whether
the respondent lives in a city.
The data
The CEX contains a total of over 311,000 observations
over 1997–2009, but when attention is restricted to
households that own single-family homes (or apart-
ments in multi-family dwellings with their own heating
system) and live in them, and we use only 2004–2009
(our preferred “window,” see below), the sample size is
86,489. Descriptive statistics of this “restricted” sample
are displayed in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Figure 3 shows that in the late 1990s home improve-
ments and renovations occurred at a rate of about 10% a
year, and that they have generally been declining since.
The rates of replacement for doors/windows and heating
systems followed similar trends, and were 2–3 % per
year by the last few years of our sample period. The
average quarterly renovation rates are 0.8 % for win-
dows and 0.7 % for heating systems. Other studies
report similarly low annual energy efficiency renovation
rates at other locations (Gans 2012; Grösche and Vance
2009).
If we apply the renovation rates observed in the
sample to the population of households the sample is
supposed to be representative of (about 15 million
households in 2009), we estimate totals of 80,000–
119,000 window and door replacements, and 90,000–
107,000 heating system replacements, every year over
the period from 2004 to 2009. We predict about 91,000
window/door replacements, and a similar number of
heating system replacements, for 2009, the last year in
our sample.
Comparison with the filings for the tax credits report-
ed by ENEA is difficult because the population the I-
CEX represents does not completely overlap with the
parties that are allowed to request the tax credits. Our
sample is comprised of single-family homeowners and
owners of units in multi-family buildings with their own
heating systems. All of these households live in a home
they own. The tax credit law, however, does not impose
the restriction that the applicant should live in the build-
ing where the renovations are done, and applies to
residential, commercial, and industrial buildings. Both
incorporated entities and individual taxpayers are
allowed to apply for the tax credits. With these limita-
tions in mind, ENEA reports that in 2009 there were
about 115,000 filings for the tax credits for windows and
doors, and 68,000 filings for heating system
replacements.
Based on the sampling weights reported in the I-
CEX, the average expenditure on windows and doors
renovations on an annual basis is €2,298.53, and that for
heating systems replacements is €2,418.62. These fig-
ures are much smaller than the mean cost per incentive-
subsidized renovation reported in the ENEAdocuments.
In 2009, for example, the average cost of window re-
placements was €9,475 and that of a heating system
replacement was €12,427. These figures are likely to
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be inflated by the extensive renovations done on large
residential buildings (which account for some 30 % of
the total) and on commercial and industrial buildings
(4 % of the total). Unfortunately, the ENEA reports do
not provide detailed information about other moments
or order statistics of the distribution of the costs of the
renovations.
Table 2 shows that over our preferred study period
(2004–2009), about 71 % of the households used net-
work gas for heating, 10 % used gas in bottles or tanks
kept outside of the home, and 7 % uses heating oil.
Wood is used by about 9 % of the households.
As shown in Table 3, almost 90 % of the households
in our sample use a central heating system that is inde-
pendent of that of neighboring dwelling units, and about
8 % have separate heating devices in different rooms
within the home. The remainder (about 3 %) relies on a
central heating system that is shared with other units.
Characteristics of the dwelling, such as the number of
rooms and age of the home, are summarized in Table 4.
Annual heating degree days and gas prices are displayed
in Table 5, whereas Table 6 describes the unemployment
rate and the state of the housing market. Table 7 reports
information about the demographic and economic cir-
cumstances of the household. This includes the time a
household has been living in the house (duration and
duration squared), the household’s size, and the number
of household members aged 17 or younger (age1) or 65
and older (age4). The I-CEX does not disclose house-
hold income, so we proxy income and wealth with the
ownership of a car, the number of homes owned, and
day-to-day consumption expenditures (on an annual
basis).
Results
Figure 3 suggests that the rates at which households
replaced windows or their heating systems declined
between 1997 and 2009. All home renovations (inclu-
sive of interior and exterior renovations, plus window
and heating equipment replacements) experienced a
similar decline.
Our first order of business is, therefore, to identify a
sufficiently stable period before the introduction of the
tax credit program. We fit Eq. (1) for window replace-
ments and heating system replacements for various pre-
program periods, and test the null hypothesis that the
coefficients on the year dummies are jointly equal to
zero. Both types of renovations appear to be stable when
attention is restricted to 2004–2006, so our subsequent
regressions use the data from 2004 to 2009, which
results in a symmetric “window” around the tax credit
law event.11
Regression results are reported in Table 8 for window
replacements during 2004–2009. We present three spec-
ifications. In all of them, the standard errors are clustered
at the Region level. Specification (A) corresponds
11 For 2004–2006, the F statistic of the null that the coefficients on
the year dummies are equal to zero is 1.65 (P value 0.2213) for
window replacements and 0.83 (P value 0.4527) for heating
system replacements. The F statistics are 2.05 and 3.82, respec-
tively, for 2002–2006, with P values of 0.1320 and 0.0217. For
2001–2006, they are 1.70 and 2.24 (P values 0.1894 and 0.1081).
A longer period (2000–2006) suggests that long-term trends are
present (F statistics 6.07 and 8.13, respectively, with P values
0.0021 and 0.0003).
Table 1 Sample and population sizes, and predicted number of
window and heating system replacements by year
Year Obs. in
the
sample
Number of
households in
the population
Number of
window
replacements
Number of
heating system
replacements
2004 14,482 12,927,203 80,461 102,257
2005 13,967 13,104,484 81,722 107,269
2006 14,177 13,646,139 85,740 89,853
2007 14,942 14,093,871 88,271 94,144
2008 14,685 14,834,778 119,097 101,973
2009 14,236 14,683,559 91,103 91,596
Table 2 Heating fuels (N=86,489)
Variable Freq. Percent
Kerosene, oil, and other liquid fuels 6,064 7.01
Gas (from pipelines) 61,419 71.01
Gas (bottles or outside tanks) 8,881 10.27
Coal, wood, coke, and other solid fuels 7,534 8.71
Other (electricity, solar, etc.) 2,439 2.82
Don’t know 152 0.18
Table 3 Type of heating system (N=86,489)
Variable Freq. Percent
Shared central heating system 2,318 2.68
Independent central heating system 77,013 89.04
Separate heating devices in each room 7,158 8.28
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directly to Eq. (2), specification (B) to Eq. (3),
and specification (C) keeps the interaction between
the policy dummy and HDDs and enters year
dummies to make sure that we are not incorrectly
attributing to the policy the effect of other macro-
economic shocks.
Starting with specification (A), the model sug-
gests that window replacements are significantly
associated with dwelling and household character-
istics. The age of the home is a strong predictor of
the likelihood that windows are replaced in any
given period, as is the size of the home. There is
no difference, however, between single-family
homes and homes in multi-family dwellings, and
rural urban locations. Wealthier and smaller house-
holds are more likely to replace their windows in
any given quarter. Education and the age compo-
sition of the family are not important, but the
latter effect is probably confounded by the inclu-
sion of “duration” (the number of years a house-
hold has lived in the home), which clearly sug-
gests that the longer the household has lived in the
home, the less likely it is to undertake window
replacements.
We have included the current price of natural gas and
the two most recent changes in natural gas prices in the
right-hand side of the model, but none of these variables
is significantly associated with window replacements.
The coefficients on these terms are positive, but statisti-
cally insignificant, a result that may be due to measure-
ment error (since we do not know exactly where a
person lives, we are forced to attribute to a household
the natural gas prices of the major city in the Region).
Replacement rates are higher in places with colder cli-
mates: The coefficient on HDDs is positive and signif-
icant at the conventional levels. In general, despite the
very low rate at which window replacements are done,
the model identifies a number of significant determi-
nants of window upgrades.12
In a regression not reported in this paper, we checked
whether there are monthly patterns in window replace-
ment rates. We did not expect to find any since (1)
window replacements are not usually done on an emer-
gency basis and (2) windows can be quickly replaced
within a day at any time of the year without
inconveniencing the occupants of a home, and indeed
the F statistic of the null that the coefficients on
the month dummies are equal to zero is only 1.83,
for a P value of 0.1275.
12 The F statistic of the null that the coefficients on all dwelling
characteristics are jointly equal to zero is 13.96 (P value less than
0.0001) and that of the null that household characteristics do not
matter is 57.23 (P value less than 0.0001). A similar test also
concludes that HDDs and gas prices matter (F statistic
6.60, P value 0.0107), whereas unemployment and the
conditions of the housing market are not important
(F statistic 0.45, P value 0.6477).
Table 4 Characteristics of the dwelling (N=86,489)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Home 11–20 years old 0.134318 0.340995 0 1
Home 21–30 years old 0.178497 0.382933 0 1
Home 31–40 years old 0.182717 0.386437 0 1
Home 41–50 years old 0.143845 0.350934 0 1
Home more than 50 years old 0.178508 0.382942 0 1
Home built before 1902 0.074183 0.26207 0 1
# Rooms 4.666223 1.563559 1 65
Home value 511.1908 268.5978 30.14311 1,632.355
Single family home 0.413787 0.492514 0 1
Urban or suburban area (not rural) 0.763797 0.424751 0 1
Table 5 Heating degree days (°F) and gas prices (constant 2009
euro/GJ) (source—Eurostat)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Annual heating degree
days (°F)
3,386.331 1,238.733 1,140 7,473.183
Gas prices (in euro
2009 per GJ)
19.14663 6.278643 0 28.26091
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Turning to the policy, in specification (A) the coeffi-
cient on the policy dummy is positive and relatively
large compared to the rate of occurrence of window
replacements. It is, however, estimated imprecisely and
statistically insignificant. One possible interpretation of
this result is that the policy is ineffective. Another is that
the rate at which window replacements are done is
simply too low for us to isolate the effects of the tax
credits policy. Alternatively, it is possible that the true
workings of the policy do not comply with a single,
uniform nationwide effect.
We relax this assumption in specification (B), where
the interaction between policy and HDD has a positive
and significant coefficient. The two policy variables
imply that at the mean HDD (3,342), the effect of the
policy is 0.0022 (s.e. 0.0014) or about 31.8 % of the
average replacement rate. Themagnitude of this effect is
thus similar to, but slightly larger than, the one from
model (A). The t statistic for this effect is, however, only
1.61.
Increasing the HDDs by one standard deviation (i.e.,
1,328), which is roughly the difference between North-
ern Italy and the rest of the country, has a very different
effect, depending on whether the tax credit policy is in
place or not. In the absence of the policy, window
replacement rates increase by 0.0014596 (s.e.
0.0009273). When the policy is in place, they increase
by 0.0031798 (s.e. 0.0009946). This latter effect is
strongly statistically significant (t statistic 3.20) and
represents a 37 % increase with respect to the average
replacement rate.
Using the results of specification (B), and taking the
policy coefficients at face value, we can also predict the
window replacement rate with and without the policy,
holding the regressors at the sample means for 2006, the
last year before the tax credits were passed. The model
predicts a quarterly replacement rate of 0.006091
(2.4364 % on an annual basis) in the absence of the
policy. Holding all regressors at their 2006 levels, the
model predicts a replacement rate of 0.008538
(3.4152 % per year)—a 40 % increase. Holding the
universe of households the same as in 2006
(1,364,614; see Table 1), we predict a total of 83,116
window replacement renovations per quarter in the ab-
sence of the policy and 116,512 in the presence of the
policy. The associated increase in expenditure is about
€63.507 million (on an annual basis).13
In specification (C), we remove the policy dummy
(which is always equal to one for 2007 and later years)
and include year dummies. The coefficients on the year
dummies indicate a decline in window installations over
time, but the coefficient on the policy–HDD interaction
remains positive and marginally significant.
Turning to the heating system replacement equations
(Table 9), dwelling and household characteristics and
climate are significantly associated with the likelihood
13 This calculation uses the 2006 mean expenditure per window
replacement (€2,106.59 on an annual basis, 2009 euro).
Table 7 Characteristics of the household (N=86,489)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Own a car 0.847807 0.35921 0 1
Own only one home 0.913931 0.280467 0 1
# Of homes owned 0.1071 0.376915 0 8
Day-to-day
consumption
expenditure, annual
total, 2009 euro
11,882.61 7,746.782 0 130,529.9
Household size 2.395125 1.306664 0 10
Age1 0.352241 0.719619 0 8
Age4 0.514193 0.714579 0 5
Duration 23.29881 16.70922 0 109
Duration squared 822.0296 1,088.86 0 11,881
Table 6 Economy-wide variables: unemployment rate and home
sales rates by Region
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Unemployment rate 7.53197 4.156086 2.046852 18.67538
State of the housing
market
0.013017 0.003317 0.006191 0.019379
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
All replace heat replace windows
Fig. 3 Annual rates for selected home renovations
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of replacing the heating system. The tax credit policy,
however, enters with a negative and statistically
insignificant coefficient, whether by itself or with the
companion variable policy×HDD.
Table 8 Window replacement; linear probability model; weighted OLS (all standard errors clustered at the Region level, N=81,095)
Specification (A) Specification (B) Specification (C)
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Gas (from pipelines) 0.00094 0.89 0.00089 0.85 0.00103 0.96
Home 11–20 years old 0.00304 2.32 0.00306 2.35 0.00306 2.35
Home 21–30 years old 0.00585 4.38 0.00588 4.42 0.00589 4.39
Home 31–40 years old 0.00718 4.31 0.00719 4.32 0.00721 4.3
Home 41–50 years old 0.00826 4.89 0.00830 4.92 0.00833 4.9
Home more than 50 years old 0.00832 4.12 0.00833 4.13 0.00838 4.14
Home built before 1902 0.00975 6.34 0.00974 6.33 0.00978 6.31
# Rooms 0.00065 1.99 0.00066 2.01 0.00066 2
Home value 1.930E−06 1.71 1.800E−06 1.54 1.960E−06 1.68
Single family home 0.00063 0.88 0.00063 0.87 0.00059 0.81
Urban or suburban area (not rural) −0.00050 −0.47 −0.00047 −0.45 −0.00054 −0.52
Annual heating degree days (°F) 2.040E−06 2.99 1.180E−06 1.57 1.580E−06 1.92
Gas prices (in euro 2009 per GJ) 0.00003 0.42 0.00004 0.54 −0.00001 −0.23
Delta gas price 0.00222 1.14 0.00206 1.04 0.00519 1.25
Delta1 gas price 0.00066 0.27 0.00074 0.31 0.00539 1.55
Own a car 0.00114 1.3 0.00112 1.29 0.00122 1.47
Own only one home −0.00278 −1.69 −0.00281 −1.71 −0.00298 −1.97
# Of homes owned −0.00151 −1.4 −0.00154 −1.43 −0.00162 −1.74
Day-to-day consumption expenditure, annual total, 2009 euro 1.970E−07 2.79 1.950E−07 2.76 2.000E−07 2.72
Household size −0.00071 −2.6 −0.00069 −2.50 −0.00084 −2.38
Age1 0.00021 0.46 0.00021 0.45 0.00026 0.55
Age4 0.00018 0.27 0.00018 0.26 0.00013 0.19
Duration −0.00019 −2.8 −0.00019 −2.79 −0.00019 −2.79
Duration squared 1.400E−06 1.39 1.390E−06 1.39 1.360E−06 1.37
University degree 0.00166 1.27 0.00167 1.28 0.00164 1.27
Unemployment rate −0.00014 −0.74 −0.00017 −0.87 −0.00013 −0.69
Home sale rate 0.00582 0.03 0.04519 0.23 −0.07941 −0.38
Policy 0.00197 1.32 −0.00243 −1.29
Policy × annual HDD 1.390E−06 1.95 1.440E−06 1.99
2005 0.00046 0.37
2006 0.00027 0.22
2007 −0.00024 −0.09
2008 −0.00265 −1.03
2009 −0.00444 −1.75
Constant −0.00754 −1.25 −0.00511 −0.85 −0.00378 −0.65
R square 0.0032 0.0033 0.0034
F statistic 5,38 5.31 4.91
Degrees of freedom of F test 28, 81,066 29, 81,065 33, 81,066
P value <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001
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To illustrate, the average heating system replacement
rate is 0.007 per quarter. Specification (B) predicts that
at the mean HDD the effect of the policy is only
0.0000421, a statistically insignificant amount (t statistic
0.03), and that only 574 additional heating system re-
placements would take place every quarter, assuming
that same universe of households as in 2006. These
results seem to point to complete policy ineffectiveness
and/or extremely high incidence of free riding: Most
likely households replace their heating systems when
they must (because the system is broken beyond repairs
or is at the end of its economic life) and this decision is
unaffected by the tax policy.
The model results, however, are also compatible with
strongly heterogeneous effects across the territory. In the
absence of the tax credit policy, a one standard deviation
increase in HDD increases the heating system replace-
ment rate by 0.0031 (t statistic 3.77). If the policy is in
place, the corresponding increase would be 0.0045 (t
statistic 2.74). These two effects are large compared to
the pre-policy rate of heating system replacement (e.g.,
0.00685 in 2006), and imply 42,306 and 61,994 replace-
ments per quarter, respectively, assuming the same uni-
verse of households as in 2006. The associated expen-
ditures are €94,288 million and €138.169 million (on an
annual basis), respectively.
We re-ran all models without weights and obtained
results that were qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
All results were confirmed when we ran probit regres-
sions in lieu of least squares. We report the results of
probit models with specifications comparable to those of
Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix 1, Tables 10 and 11. With
probit models, we computed the marginal effects of the
policy and of heating degree days at the sample means
and found that they were virtually undistinguishable
from the ones for the linear probability specification.
For example, using the results in Table 10 of Appen-
dix 1, specification (A) predicts that the marginal effect
of the policy is a 0.0021 increase in the probability of
replacing windows. This marginal effect is the same as
that from the linear probability model in Table 8 and
likewise statistically insignificant.
Specification (B) in Table 10 implies that at the mean
HDD the marginal effect of the policy is 0.0019, which
is within 15 % of the marginal effect based on the
analogous linear probability model in Table 8. Finally,
increasing the HDD by one standard deviation above the
mean increases window replacement rates by 0.0016 in
the absence of the policy and by 0.0036 when the policy
is in place. The comparable effects from the linear
probability model are very close—0.0015 and 0.0032,
respectively.
We note that in all of the specifications reported in
Tables 8 and 9, and in Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix 1,
having gas heat is regarded as exogenous. This is be-
cause when we tested for the endogeneity of the house-
hold’s choice of natural gas as primary heating fuel, we
found no evidence of such endogeneity. This was the
case with all three of the approaches we deployed.
We report the results of the bivariate probit model
where gas heat is treated as endogenous in Appendix 2.
The results show that the exogenous variables deployed
to explain the presence of gas heat are generally strongly
associated with adopting gas heat: The regression coef-
ficients are statistically significant at the 1 % level or
better for at least nine regressors. The coefficient of
correlation across the error terms underlying the two
equations, however, is only −0.12 and statistically insig-
nificant (t statistic 0.198). AWald test and a likelihood
ratio test likewise fail to reject the null that the correla-
tion coefficient is zero, which means that there is no
evidence that gas heating is endogenous with the deci-
sion to replace the windows.
Appendix 3 displays the results of 2SLS estimation
of a linear probability model where the dependent var-
iable is the decision to replace the windows and having
gas heat is regarded as potentially endogenous. The
results show our identifying instruments (gas lines and
gas network variables) are strongly associated with the
presence of gas heat, as are many other exogenous
variables included in the first stage. The coefficient of
gas heat is, however, insignificant in the second stage.
The coefficient on gas heat is likewise insignificant in
the bivariate probit model, and in all of the specifica-
tions in Tables 8 and 9, and 10 and 11 in the Appendix.14
We also wondered whether the passage of the tax
credit programmay have encouraged households towait
until after February 19, 2007 to change their windows or
heating systems, so that they could avail themselves of
the credit. If this was the case, we would expect a “dip”
in the replacements rates in 2006, followed by an in-
crease in 2007.Wewould have expected this effect to be
more pronounced for window replacements, on the
grounds of the non-emergency nature of these
renovations.
14 The results from similar estimation strategies for changing the
heating system are similar and available from the authors.
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To see if this is the case, we estimated models
similar to Eq. (1) but included both pre- and post-
policy years (2004 and later years). With both
window and heating system replacements, the
Table 9 Heating replacement; linear probability model; weighted OLS (all standard errors clustered at the Region level, N=81,095)
Specification (A) Specification (B) Specification (C)
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Gas (from pipelines) −0.00095 −0.65 −0.00100 −0.66 −0.00101 −0.65
Home 11–20 years old 0.00231 1.85 0.00233 1.86 0.00233 1.86
Home 21–30 years old 0.00384 2.41 0.00386 2.41 0.00386 2.4
Home 31–40 years old 0.00388 4.49 0.00389 4.49 0.00389 4.5
Home 41–50 years old 0.00423 2.65 0.00426 2.64 0.00427 2.66
Home more than 50 years old 0.00412 3.53 0.00412 3.51 0.00412 3.54
Home built before 1902 0.00355 1.94 0.00355 1.94 0.00353 1.93
# Rooms 0.00095 3.19 0.00096 3.21 0.00095 3.17
Home value −5.600E−07 −0.42 −6.700E−07 −0.52 −6.150E−07 −0.49
Single family home 0.00008 0.11 0.00008 0.11 0.00008 0.1
Urban or suburban area (not rural) 0.00083 2.1 0.00086 2.08 0.00086 2.02
Annual heating degree days (° F) 3.230E−06 3.15 2.500E−06 3.77 2.560E−06 3.36
Gas prices (in euro 2009 per GJ) −0.00003 −0.9 −0.00002 −0.72 −0.00002 −0.44
Delta gas price −0.00106 −1.03 −0.00120 −1.14 0.00054 0.17
Delta1 gas price −0.00468 −1.84 −0.00461 −1.82 −0.00261 −0.61
Own a car 0.00214 1.77 0.00212 1.77 0.00216 1.78
Own only one home −0.00002 −0.01 −0.00005 −0.02 0.00042 0.13
# Of homes owned 0.00205 0.69 0.00203 0.68 0.00243 0.79
Day-to-day consumption expenditure,
annual total, 2009 euro
2.720E−07 3.94 2.710E−07 3.92 2.740E−07 3.99
Household size −0.00059 −1.03 −0.00058 −1.00 −0.00064 −1.1
Age1 0.00135 1.56 0.00135 1.55 0.00137 1.58
Age4 0.00098 1.34 0.00098 1.34 0.00095 1.3
Duration −0.00014 −1.32 −0.00014 −1.31 −0.00014 −1.31
Duration squared 1.590E−06 0.96 1.580E−06 0.95 1.590E−06 0.95
University degree −0.00013 −0.15 −0.00012 −0.14 −0.00013 −0.16
Unemployment rate 0.00010 0.49 0.00008 0.41 0.00007 0.34
Home sale rate 0.03297 0.25 0.06600 0.46 0.01046 0.06
Policy −0.00016 −0.11 −0.00385 −1.62
Policy × annual HDD 1.170E−06 1.07 1.200E−06 1.15
2005 0.00090 1.09
2006 −0.00085 −0.87
2007 −0.00276 −0.92
2008 −0.00411 −2.26
2009 −0.00438 −2.67
Constant −0.01428 −1.79 −0.01224 −1.89 −0.01206 −1.66
R square 0.0029 0.0029 0.0030
F statistic 5.15 5.16 4.82
Degrees of freedom of F test 28, 81,066 29, 81,065 33, 81,066
P value <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001
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coefficient on the 2006 year dummy was small
and not statistically different from those of the
previous and following year. We conclude that
there is no particular evidence of “strategic” timing
of equipment replacement. It must be recognized,
however, that it is difficult to make inference from
the low rates of equipment replacement observed
in the sample.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the effect of energy
efficiency incentives on household decisions to
invest in energy efficiency improvements in their
home. We used several waves of the Italy Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey. This survey does not
ask individuals whether they did receive a tax
credit for their energy efficiency renovations, so
we have simply examined whether energy
efficiency upgrades increased when the policy
was in place.
Attention is restricted to households who own
single-family homes or apartments in multi-family
buildings, and live in their own homes. To avoid
incorrectly attributing the effects of long-term
trends to the incentive policy that was established
in Italy in 2007, we have limited the sample to a
relatively narrow window around the introduction
of the policy (2004–2009), tested for pre-trends,
and controlled for factors thought to influence
home renovations in our regressions.
We have examined two types of energy efficien-
cy renovations potentially covered by the policy—
window/door replacements and heating system re-
placements. We reason that the former are unlikely
to be dictated by emergency or equipment break-
downs, and they are often done as part of a
general update of the dwelling. The latter may
be, since heating is needed in the winter, there is
no market for used heating systems, and replace-
ments are often done when the existing equipment
breaks beyond repairs or at the end of its econom-
ic life. Free-riding behavior is possible and likely
for either type of renovation.
Our analysis is motivated by simple theoretical con-
siderations that posit that individuals derive utility from
the housing and energy services of their homes, and will
do energy efficiency upgrades if the net benefits of
doing so are greater than the net benefits of keeping
the current equipment. Our econometric model is a
linear probability model. Our simplest specification as-
sumes that the effect of the policy is uniform over time
and for all climates; we subsequently relax these
assumptions.
The estimation results suggest that the tax incentive
policy was more effective in encouraging window re-
placements in harsher climates, and that, all else the
same, the policy would raise window replacements by
37–40 % in sufficiently cold climates. Our simplest
models suggest that the policy has no “bite” with
heating system replacements, or that free riding is al-
most complete with this type of equipment. On further
examination, however, the regression results indicate
that the effects of the policy are heterogeneous across
the territory and are in fact sizeable in the colder parts of
the country.
Caution is needed when interpreting these re-
sults. The replacement rates are always very small,
which in turn means that the effects of the policy
are estimated imprecisely. We do not know wheth-
er a household actually applied for and received a
tax credit for its renovations, or was even aware of
the tax credits policy. Given the typical expendi-
ture associated with the renovations documented in
the I-CEX, we suspect that for most of the house-
holds here examined the administrative burden was
sufficiently heavy to discourage filing, even if the
household was aware of the tax credit policy. In
closing, we wish to emphasize that, in order to
study energy efficiency renovations and upgrades,
and to make inference about the likely effects of
policies aimed at influencing energy use, energy
efficiency improvements in homes, and the adop-
tion of alternate sources of energy in Italy, it will
be important to design and administer surveys that
are specifically designed for these purposes.
Acknowledgments The authors are very grateful to
Francesco Bosello, Cristina Cattaneo, Roberta Distante,
Massimo Filippini, and Elena Verdolini for helpful discus-
sions. We are also grateful to the attendees of the 12th
IEAEE congress in Venice, the 5th EMEE workshop in
Berlin, and the CEPE seminar series at ETH Zurich, where
this paper was presented, for their comments and sugges-
tions. This research was funded by the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under
grant agreement No. 265325 (PURGE—Public health im-
pacts in URban environments of Greenhouse gas Emissions
reduction strategies).
Energy Efficiency (2014) 7:571–590 585
Appendices
Appendix 1. Probit models
Table 10 Window replacement: probit model (N=81,095); weighted maximum likelihood estimation
Specification (A) Specification (B) Specification (C)
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Gas (from pipelines) 0.08184 1.12 0.07896 1.09 0.09112 1.24
Home 11–20 years old 0.19560 1.99 0.19546 1.98 0.19623 1.99
Home 21–30 years old 0.34550 4.98 0.34641 5.01 0.34846 4.99
Home 31–40 years old 0.40992 6.05 0.41141 6.07 0.41475 6.02
Home 41–50 years old 0.46142 5.91 0.46266 5.89 0.46677 5.92
Home more than 50 years old 0.44644 4.45 0.44688 4.45 0.45121 4.49
Home built before 1902 0.50772 7.46 0.50893 7.44 0.51231 7.53
# Rooms 0.02827 2.46 0.02864 2.49 0.02829 2.49
Home value 0.00011 1.65 0.00010 1.58 0.00012 1.82
Single family home 0.02974 0.73 0.03003 0.73 0.02655 0.63
Urban or suburban area (not rural) −0.03618 −0.62 −0.03610 −0.62 −0.04161 −0.73
Annual heating degree days (°F) 0.00012 3.02 0.00007 1.37 0.00009 1.77
Gas prices (in euro 2009 per GJ) 0.00452 0.59 0.00520 0.66 −0.00054 −0.14
Delta gas price 0.09185 0.82 0.07820 0.69 0.33184 1.50
Delta1 gas price 0.00371 0.02 0.00756 0.05 0.34774 1.79
Own a car 0.10265 2.07 0.10146 2.04 0.10510 2.23
Own only one home −0.14787 −1.78 −0.15089 −1.80 −0.15481 −2.11
# Of homes owned −0.08358 −1.48 −0.08492 −1.50 −0.08606 −1.85
Day-to-day consumption expenditure, annual total, 2009 euro 8.95E−06 3.78 8.89E−06 3.71 9.15E−06 3.70
Household size −0.03765 −2.53 −0.03747 −2.50 −0.04458 −2.40
Age1 0.01412 0.53 0.01480 0.56 0.01752 0.63
Age4 0.00550 0.15 0.00519 0.15 0.00232 0.06
Duration −0.00834 −2.69 −0.00828 −2.67 −0.00813 −2.61
Duration squared 0.00006 1.14 0.00006 1.12 0.00006 1.09
University degree 0.08075 1.46 0.08150 1.47 0.08032 1.48
Unemployment rate −0.01890 −1.66 −0.02099 −1.80 −0.01894 −1.62
Home sale rate −3.72967 −0.37 −1.87595 −0.19 −10.88154 −1.10
Policy 0.12364 1.17 −0.19126 −1.01
Policy × annual HDD 0.00009 1.79 0.00010 1.96
2005 0.02192 0.31
2006 0.00016 0.00
2007 −0.08794 −0.43
2008 −0.27825 −1.35
2009 −0.38281 −1.84
Constant −3.34723 −10.39 −3.16215 −9.53 −3.00281 −11.08
Pseudo R squared 0.0426 0.0433 0.0466
Wald statistic 192.28 202.10 215.96
Degrees of freedom of Wald test 28 29 33
P value <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001
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Table 11 Heating system replacement: probit model (N=81,095); weighted maximum likelihood estimation
Specification (A) Specification (B) Specification (C)
Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.
Gas (from pipelines) −0.04079 −0.53 −0.04281 −0.55 −0.04148 −0.51
Home 11–20 years old 0.13427 1.99 0.13508 2.00 0.13428 1.99
Home 21–30 years old 0.20670 2.42 0.20820 2.42 0.20783 2.39
Home 31–40 years old 0.20617 3.88 0.20726 3.90 0.20668 3.91
Home 41–50 years old 0.21769 2.48 0.21886 2.47 0.21925 2.49
Home more than 50 years old 0.20374 3.84 0.20356 3.79 0.20286 3.80
Home built before 1902 0.17245 1.87 0.17118 1.85 0.16988 1.83
# Rooms 0.03748 3.76 0.03796 3.83 0.03746 3.77
Home value −0.00002 −0.33 −0.00003 −0.46 −0.00002 −0.38
Single family home 0.00245 0.06 0.00323 0.08 0.00249 0.06
Urban or suburban area (not rural) 0.03991 1.76 0.02245 0.08 0.03923 1.67
Annual heating degree days (°F) 0.00018 3.26 0.00012 3.24 0.00013 3.00
Gas prices (in euro 2009 per GJ) −0.00381 −1.74 0.00196 0.13 −0.00306 −1.11
Delta gas price −0.05318 −0.81 −0.07026 −1.04 0.06790 0.35
Delta1 gas price −0.26918 −2.01 0.13693 0.05 −0.10337 −0.45
Own a car 0.19028 2.89 0.18812 2.87 0.19009 2.89
Own only one home −0.01807 −0.20 −0.01857 −0.20 −0.00015 0.00
# Of homes owned 0.07154 0.84 0.07086 0.82 0.08688 0.99
Day-to-day consumption expenditure,
annual total, 2009 euro
0.00001 6.39 0.00001 6.33 0.00001 6.31
Household size −0.02211 −0.84 −0.02217 −0.83 −0.02564 −0.95
Age1 0.05958 1.66 0.06050 1.68 0.06197 1.74
Age4 0.04615 1.44 0.04604 1.44 0.04443 1.38
Duration −0.00704 −1.23 −0.00697 −1.22 −0.00685 −1.21
Duration squared 0.00008 0.97 0.00008 0.96 0.00008 0.95
University degree 0.00127 0.03 0.00234 0.06 0.00223 0.05
Unemployment rate 0.00037 0.03 −0.00232 −0.23 −0.00287 −0.29
Home sale rate −2.03470 −0.35 6.26274 0.99 −4.26467 −0.52
Policy −0.05064 −0.70 −0.39274 −2.70
Policy × annual HDD 0.00010 1.83 0.00010 2.09
2005 0.03668 0.80
2006 −0.05436 −1.06
2007 −0.32041 −1.94
2008 −0.43387 −3.62
2009 −0.45948 −3.50
Constant −3.50434 −9.79 −3.31829 −11.96 −3.28574 −10.47
Pseudo R squared 0.0342 0.0353 0.0359
Wald statistic 195.01 188.78 194.21
Degrees of freedom of Wald test 28 29 33
P value <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001
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Appendix 2
Table 12 Bivariate probit model, N=81,095; weighted maximum likelihood estimation (all standard errors clustered at the Region level)
Dep. var.: replace windows Coeff. t stat. Dep. var.: gas heat Coeff. t stat.
Gas heat (from pipelines) 0.2789241 0.29 Day-to-day consumption 4.13E−07 0.25
House 11–20 years old 0.1979619 2.08 No gas network 2006 −2.45526 −7.07
House 21–30 years old 0.3518979 5.49 Gas network km hp 2006 0.000353 0.25
House 31–40 years old 0.4131897 6.74 Gas network km mp 2006 −2.3E−05 −0.36
House 41–50 years old 0.4630001 6.07 Gas network km lp 2006 8.20E−06 0.34
Home 50+ years old 0.4548458 5.46 Urban or suburban area (not rural) 0.817974 11.52
Home built before 1902 0.5256832 6.13 Own a car 0.083058 2.12
Number of rooms 0.0315911 1.31 Owns only one home −0.15935 −1.98
Home value 0.0000621 0.23 Number of homes owned −0.05359 −1.46
SF home 0.0303026 0.76 House 11–20 years old −0.07778 −2.25
Urban or suburban area (not rural) −0.0818747 −0.29 House 21–30 years old −0.19601 −4.11
Annual HDD (°F) 0.000109 1.15 House 31–40 years old −0.15287 −3.04
Gas price (2009 € per GJ) 0.0007985 0.04 House 41–50 years old −0.12003 −2.1
Delta gas price 0.1167229 0.6 Home 50+ years old −0.24874 −5.38
Delta 1 gas price 0.0159187 0.12 Home built before 1902 −0.42088 −7.36
Owns a car 0.0970132 1.44 Annual HDD (°F) 0.000236 2.18
Owns only one home −0.1347115 −2 Gas price (2009 € per GJ) −0.014 −0.93
Number of homes owned −0.0762928 −1.69 Delta gas price 0.095798 0.62
Day-to-day consumption 8.87E−06 3.3 Delta1 gas price 0.350451 2.12
Household size −0.035109 −1.77 Home value 0.000875 8.21
Age1 0.0128644 0.42 Number of rooms −0.06546 −4.9
Age4 0.004913 0.14 Household size −0.02647 −1.92
Duration −0.0082657 −2.45 Age1 0.015307 1.39
Duration squared 0.0000629 1.45 Age4 0.01556 1.09
University degree 0.0808303 1.46 Duration −0.00223 −1.22
Unemployment rate −0.0178556 −1.3 Duration squared −4.2E−05 −2.02
Home sale rate −5.684117 −0.52 Unemployment rate −0.00815 −0.3
Policy 0.0779002 0.34 Home sale rate 61.40947 2.47
Constant −3.301822 −6.66 Policy 0.175324 1.27
Constant −0.88003 −1.15
Rho (correlation coeff.) −0.1158767 0.198
log L −38,869,138.00
Wald test of rho=0: χ2(1)=0.03924 Prob>χ2=0.8430
Wald χ2 (57 dof) 10,804.22 P=0.0000
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Table 13 Weighted 2SLS instrumental variable estimation (linear probability equations), N=81,095
First stage Second stage
Dep. var.: gas heat Coeff. t stat. Dep. var.: replace windows Coeff. t stat.
Gas heat (from pipelines) −0.00062 −0.54
House 11–20 years old −0.0112 −2 House 11–20 years old 0.003025 2.31
House 21–30 years old −0.0355 −6.09 House 21–30 years old 0.005794 4.4
House 31–40 years old −0.01725 −2.9 House 31–40 years old 0.007152 4.32
House 41–50 years old −0.00291 −0.48 House 41–50 years old 0.008247 4.89
House 50+ years old −0.02058 −3.43 House 50+ years old 0.008259 4.11
House built before 1902 −0.05273 −7.18 House built before 1902 0.009618 6.18
Number of rooms −0.01165 −10.7 Number of rooms 0.000637 1.93
Home value 0.00014 22.14 Home value 2.23E−06 1.94
SF home −0.11357 −33.75 SF home 0.000441 0.62
Urban or suburban area (not rural) 0.200309 48.55 Urban or suburban area (not rural) −0.00017 −0.15
Annual HDD (°F) 4.49E−05 16.62 Annual HDD (°F) 2.17E−06 2.95
Gas price (2009 € per GJ) −0.00464 −4.8 Gas price (2009 € per GJ) 6.63E−05 0.94
Delta gas price 0.0422 3.83 Delta gas price 0.001979 0.99
Delta1 gas price 0.097877 8.2 Delta1 gas price 0.000512 0.21
Owns a car 0.001197 0.27 Owns a car 0.001186 1.36
Owns only one home −0.01576 −1.18 Owns only one home −0.00288 −1.77
Number of homes owned −0.00516 −0.51 Number of homes owned −0.00157 −1.46
Day-to-day consumption −3.11E−07 −1.52 Day-to-day consumption 1.97E−07 2.79
Household size −0.00315 −1.88 Household size −0.00073 −2.7
Age1 −0.00155 −0.55 Age1 0.000219 0.47
Age4 0.006982 2.98 Age4 0.000193 0.29
Duration −0.00013 −0.43 Duration −0.00019 −2.79
Duration squared −8.41E−06 −1.86 Duration squared 1.36E−06 1.37
University degree 0.039528 9.42 University degree 0.001736 1.33
Unemployment rate 0.000582 0.79 Unemployment rate −0.00014 −0.76
Home sale rate 15.25015 16 Home sale rate 0.019961 0.1
Policy 0.031324 3.56 Policy 0.002389 1.5
No gas network 2006 −0.44687 −21.38 Constant −0.00803 −1.32
Gas network km hp 2006 0.000119 4.15
Gas network km mp 2006 −5.76E−06 −5.23
Gas network km lp2006 1.94E−06 4.93
Autonomous −0.12358 −13.27
Separate −0.70775 −70.58
Constant 0.564594 16.27
Energy Efficiency (2014) 7:571–590 589
References
Allaire, M., & Brown, S., (2012). “US energy subsidies: effects on
energy markets and carbon emission,” prepared for the Pew
Charitable Trusts, http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Fiscal_and_Budget_Policy/
EnergySubsidiesFINAL.pdf.
Allcott, H., & Greenstone, M. (2012). Is there an energy efficiency
gap? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(1), 3–28.
Auffhammer, M., Blumstein, C., & Fowlie, M. (2008). Demand-
sidemanagement and energy efficiency revisited. The Energy
Journal, 29(3), 91–104.
Blumstein, C. (2010). Program evaluation and incentives for ad-
ministrators of energy efficiency programs: can evaluation
solve the principal/agent problem? Energy Policy, 38, 6232–
6239.
Boomhower, J., & Davis, L. W. (2013). Free riders and the high
cost of energy-efficiency subsidies. Berkeley: University of
California. March.
Choi Granade, H. et al. (2009). Unlocking Energy Efficiency in
the U.S. Economy, McKinsey Global Energy and Materials,
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/en/Client_Service/
Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinking/
Unlocking_energy_efficiency_in_the_US_economy.aspx
(last accessed 17 August 2011).
Dubin, J. A., & McFadden, D. (1984). An econometric analysis
of residential electric appliance holdings and consumption.
Econometrica, 52(2), 345–362.
ENEA (2008). Le detrazioni fiscali del 55% per la riqualificazione
energetica del patrimonio edilizio esistente nel 2007, Rome,
Italy. http://efficienzaenergetica.acs.enea.it/doc/rapporto_
2007.pdf.
ENEA (2009). Le detrazioni fiscali del 55% per la riqualificazione
energetica del patrimonio edilizio esistente nel 2008, Rome,
Italy. http://efficienzaenergetica.acs.enea.it/doc/rapporto_
2008.pdf.
ENEA (2010). Le detrazioni fiscali del 55% per la riqualificazione
energetica del patrimonio edilizio esistente nel 2009, Rome,
Italy. http://efficienzaenergetica.acs.enea.it/doc/rapporto_
2009.pdf.
Evans, W. N., & Schwab, R. (1995). Finishing high school and
starting college: do catholic schools make a difference?
Quarterly Journal of Economics, CX(4), 941–974.
Gans, W. L. (2012). The role of prices and information in residen-
tial energy consumption and investment behavior. PhD dis-
sertation, University of Maryland, College Park, April.
Gans, W., Alberini, A., & Longo, A. (2013). Smart meter devices
and the effect of feedback on residential electricity consump-
tion: evidence from a natural experiment in Northern Ireland.
Energy Economics, 36, 729–743.
Gillingham, K., & Palmer, K. (2013). “Bridging the energy effi-
ciency gap,” Resources for the Future discussion paper 13-
02, Washington, DC, January.
Golove, W. H., & Eto, J. H. (1996). Market barriers to energy
efficiency: a critical reappraisal of the rationale for public
policies to promote energy efficiency. Berkeley: Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory, UC Berkeley.
Grösche, P., & Vance, C. (2009). Willingness-to-pay for energy
conservation and free-ridership on subsidization: evidence
from Germany. The Energy Journal, 30, 141–160.
Grösche, P., Schmidt, C. M., & Vance, C. (2013). Identifying free-
riding in home-renovation programs using revealed prefer-
ence data. Journal of Economics and Statistics, 233, 600–
618.
Haberl, H., Adensam, H., & Geissler, S. (1998). Optimal climate
protection strategies for space heating: the case of Austria.
Energy Policy, 26(15), 1125–1135.
Hartman, R. S. (1988). Self-selection bias in the evaluation of
voluntary energy conservation programs. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 70(3), 448–458.
Hassett, K. A., & Metcalf, G. E. (1995). Energy tax credits and
residential conservation investment: evidence from panel
data. Journal of Public Economics, 57, 201–217.
Jaffe, A. B., & Stavins, R. N. (1994). The energy efficiency gap.
What does it mean? Energy Policy, 22(10), 804–810.
Joskow, P. L., & Marron, D. B. (1992). What does a megawatt
really cost? Evidence from utility conservation programs.
The Energy Journal, 13, 41–73.
Kushler, M., Vine, E., & York, D. (2003). Using energy efficiency
to help address electric systems reliability: an initial exami-
nation of 2001 experience. Energy, 28, 303–317.
Levine, M., Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Blok, K., Geng, L., Harvey, D.,
Lang, S., Levermore, G., Mehlwana, A. M., Mirasgedis, S.,
Novikova, A., Rilling, J., & Yoshino, H. (2007). “Residential
and commercial buildings,” (pp 53–58) in Climate Change
2007.
Loughran, D. S., & Kulik, J. (2004). Demand-side management
and energy efficiency in the United States. The Energy
Journal, 25(1), 19–43.
Malm, E. (1996). An action-based estimate of the free-rider frac-
tion in electric utility DSM programs. The Energy Journal,
25, 19–44.
Mansur, E., Mendelsohn, R., & Morrison, W. (2008). Climate
change adaptation: a study of fuel choice and consump-
tion in the US. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 55(2), 175–193.
Meier, H., & Rehdanz, K. (2010). Determinants of residential
space heating expenditures in Great Britain. Energy
Economics, 32, 949–959.
Moulton, B. R. (1990). An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the
effect of aggregate variable on micro units. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 72, 334–338.
Shorrock, L. D. (1999). An analysis of the effect of government
grants on the uptake of home insulation measures. Energy
Policy, 27, 155–171.
Vine, E. (2003). Opportunities for promoting energy efficiency in
buildings as an air quality compliance approach. Energy, 28,
319–341.
Vine, E., du Pont, P., &Waide, P. (2001). Evaluating the impact of
appliance efficiency labeling programs and standards: pro-
cess, impact, and market transformation evaluations. Energy,
26, 1041–1039.
Waldman, D. M., & Ozog, M. T. (1996). Natural and incentive-
induced conservation in voluntary energy management
programs. Southern Economic Journal, 62(4), 1054–1071.
Walsh, M. J. (1989). Energy tax credits and housing improve-
ments. Energy Economics, 11(4), 275–284.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section
and panel data (2nd ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Young, D. (2008). Who pays for the ‘beer fridge’? Evidence from
Canada. Energy Policy, 36, 353–560.
590 Energy Efficiency (2014) 7:571–590
